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Abstract 
We consider the role of trustees –who are nominated to protect the interests of investors– in 
securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine 
the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower 
spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that 
trustees’ reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became 
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1. Introduction  
Investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) suffered tremendous losses during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. Stakeholders –issuers, rating agencies, trustees, and investors– across the securitization 
chain were blamed for failing to meet expected standards. Issuers relaxed lending criteria for 
mortgages that underlay the MBSs (Keys et al., 2009; Keys et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Kara et al., 
2016), rating agencies underestimated the risk embedded in these securities (Coval et al., 
2009; Brennan et al., 2009; Richardson and White, 2009), trustees failed to enforce repurchase clauses 
(Dolmetsch, 2014; Stempel, 2016; Yoon, 2014) and investors were criticised for being overly reliant 
on credit ratings (Mahlmann, 2012). Modern securitization has grown significantly since the 1980s. 
Although the use of securitization techniques was initially a United States (US) phenomenon, the swift 
growth of European securitization in the late 1990s has been attributed to the introduction of the Euro 
and increased financial market integration. Outstanding volumes climbed by about 1400% from $139 
billion in 1999 to $2 trillion in 2007. These volumes were largely driven by the securitization of 
mortgages, which accounted for 62% of European securitization outstanding by mid-2007. 
In this paper, we consider the role of trustees in securitization pricing and whether investors 
relied on trustees to mitigate MBS risks. Trustees play an important role on securitization transactions. 
They are nominated to protect the interests of investors by managing the special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
on their behalf. As agents, trustees protect investors’ interests by ensuring compliance of issuers and 
servicers with the agreements governing the securitization deal (Gorton and Metrick, 2012a). They are 
also responsible for channelling payments to investors and notifying them of representation and 
warranty violations. This data intensive role also involves validating the performance of the collateral 
underlying the MBS on behalf of investors (Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2012). Investors rely on trustees 
to enforce repurchase obligations as provisions in the indenture do not allow direct repurchase requests 
from investors.  
We examine whether investors price the efficacy of the trustee mechanism into initial MBS 
prices. In particular, given the certification value of reputation in the financial services industry (Booth 
and Smith, 1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986; Fang, 2005), we hypothesise that investors may have 
attempted to mitigate risks by considering trustee reputation when pricing MBS.  We test our 
arguments by examining the initial yields of MBS issuances. A number of studies show that investors 
incorporate the potential costs of misaligned interests in the primary yields of MBSs by accounting for 
issuer size, rating bias, collateral, and tranche structure (Fabozzi and Vink, 2012a, 2015; He et al., 
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2012). We contend that larger and more active trustees may be perceived as more efficient in 
identifying discrepancies and notifying investors of breaches accordingly. They may create value for 
investors, especially during credit events. Consequently, MBSs with reputable trustees should have 
lower risk and lower spreads. 
We contribute to the literature by factoring trustee reputation into the determination of primary 
spreads to examine whether investors incorporate potential trustee indiscipline in initial valuations of 
MBSs. This is a dimension of securitization pricing that has not been investigated. For example, 
Andres et al. (2012) study the influence of trustees in pricing but only for high yield US corporate 
bonds. It is conceivable that investors relied on trustees to detect fraud for a multiple reasons (Colloff, 
2005). First, except for the servicer, the trustee remains the main party with direct administrative 
responsibilities from deal closure to the maturity of the MBSs. Second, the trustee performs a fiduciary 
role in an event of default. Third, trustees tend be experts in regulatory and compliance issues. In 
addition, they tend to have marked international presence to tackle collateral liquidation and litigation 
in various jurisdictions. Finally, trustees typically offer enhanced services in excess of conventional 
trustee services for additional fees.   
We build a unique dataset comprising 4,201 tranches from 730 transactions originated in 
Europe between 1999 and the first half of 2007. Our focus is on the European market whose growth 
was mainly due to private market forces rather than government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the 
US market. The US securitization markets expanded primarily due to the influence of the GSEs. 
However, EU law (Articles 87 and 88 of the EC treaty) prohibits state aid in the form of guarantees as 
this may distort competition in the mortgage markets (Coles and Hardt, 2000).  Furthermore, the 
growth of European securitization was largely inhibited by regulatory constraints (Stone and Zissu, 
2000).1  
The outstanding growth of the European mortgage securitization markets has been attributed 
to increased institutional demand, technological and financial innovation, and the introduction of the 
Euro (Altunbas et al., 2009). The adoption of the Euro resulted in the elimination of exchange rate risk 
in the Euro area, lowered transaction costs, and increased liquidity. However, the growth of the 
securitization markets has been heterogeneous across the Euromarket.2 This growth was attained with 
                                                 
1 Most of continental Europe required specific regulation to allow the issuance of MBSs (Stone and Zissu, 2000). This setback was addressed by the 
enactment of securitization-enabling regulation in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
2 Asset securitization in the Euro area is driven by countries that experienced real estate repricing after the introduction of the Euro in Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands and Portugal (Altunbas et al., 2009).   
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certain associated costs: agency problems that misaligned incentives, increased complexity and 
opaqueness of securitized bonds that rendered efficient pricing difficult (Segoviano et al., 2015). Given 
this backdrop, investors in Europe may have relied on other avenues such as credit ratings and trustees 
for mitigating MBS risks. Therefore, we aim to assess whether investors may have incorporated the 
experience and reputation of trustees in the pricing of MBSs. 
We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower MBS spreads during the credit boom 
period (between 2005 and the first half of 2007) prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Furthermore, 
the importance of reputable trustees for risk mitigation increased gradually each year between 2005 
and 2007 as the crisis loomed. Our findings suggest that the reputation of trustees was deemed to be a 
critical yardstick as risk assessment became more difficult.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background to the securitization 
trustee’s role and reviews the extant literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 puts forward the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review  
Our paper is related to three strands of the literature, which we review in the sub-sections 
below. Firstly, we explain the role of securitization trustees and the problems these intermediaries face. 
Subsequently, we review studies on the role of intermediaries as delegated monitors in the 
securitization context. Finally, the third strand of the literature examines the certification role of 
intermediary reputation in financial markets. 
2.1. The Role of the Securitization Trustee 
Securitization involves the conversion of relatively illiquid assets such as mortgages into tradable 
securities. This is achieved by transferring a pool of mortgage loans to a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), established solely for this transaction. With guidance from ratings agencies, an underwriter 
structures the asset pool into tranches, which are then rated and issued as MBSs to investors. The key 
aspects of the securitization transaction are governed by a contractual document known as a pooling 
and servicing agreement (PSA).  
The PSA governs the transfer of mortgage loans to the SPV, management of the SPV, servicing 
of the pooled mortgages and issuance of the MBSs to investors. The foremost section of this contract 
defines the rights and obligations of the deal parties (originators, servicers, trustees and investors). The 
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subsequent sections focus on structural considerations, servicing standards, and the reporting 
framework (McQueen et al., 2013). 
The originator (also termed the seller, issuer, or sponsor) advances mortgages to borrowers and 
aggregates these mortgages into an asset pool while the servicer collects periodic payments from 
borrowers. Consequently, the originator and servicer3 are more knowledgeable about the mortgages 
securitized than other deal parties, particularly investors. The originator usually retains an obligation 
to augment or substitute assets within the pool if asset values fall below certain thresholds. In this 
regard, the trustee is empowered to demand the addition of new assets or replacement of assets that no 
longer conform to asset requirements specified in the PSA (ABA, 2010). The servicer is also 
responsible for reporting collections and loss amounts to trustees who are in turn charged with the 
calculation and distribution of cash flows/losses based on the servicer’s reports. Furthermore, trustees 
are required to review servicer reports to detect breaches of warranty and representations by the issuer 
and servicer. 
Morton (2005) explains that the pre-default duties of trustees in securitization arrangements 
are conventionally twofold. Firstly, the trustee provides non-discretionary agency services that are 
largely ministerial in nature such as acting as analytics provider, account custodian (or cash manager) 
and principal paying agent.4 Secondly, as the asset custodian, the trustee is the legal representative of 
noteholders and holds legal title to the SPV’s assets on their behalf. As a delegated monitor, the trustee 
holds lien on the assets and is authorised to enforce specified remedies in the interest of investors as 
dictated by the transaction documentation or a controlling majority of noteholders. A banking 
institution usually performs the former role while the latter must be performed by a trust company. 
However, most trustees package all these services such that they become a one-stop shop for all trust 
and administrative services.  
In an event of default5, the trustee’s responsibilities surpass detecting negligence and the trustee 
is now required to conduct the affairs of the SPV according to the prudent man rule6. The trustee is 
                                                 
3 In practice, the originator and servicer are commonly the same institution or of the same banking group (He et al., 2012). 
4 The analytics provider is responsible for preparing regular (usually monthly) reports on the notes, deal performance and the evolution of the portfolio 
composition. The account custodian is tasked with operating and monitoring the SPV’s bank account and the paying agent. Collections from the servicer 
are passed on to the paying agent who uses these funds to settle transaction participants’ fees and expenses, interest and principal payments on the 
obligations due on the tranches according to the priority of payments (waterfall provisions) in the transaction documentations (Slaughter and May, 2010; 
ABA, 2010)  
5 Concerns regarding defaults also arise where the servicer fails to make scheduled remittances/advances to the trust or where the originator/servicer 
violates any covenants as indicated in the PSA. Where a breach occurs, the trustee transforms into an active participant and proactively notifies investors 
of the said breach and awaits the instructions of the next course of action on investors’ behalf. 
6 In Speight v Gaunt [1883] UKHL 1, Lord Blackburn is quoted saying “…as a general rule a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in 
managing trust affairs all those precautions, which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own”. Furthermore, 
quoting Lord Lindley in the case of In Re Whiteley [1886] 33 Ch. Div. 347 “…the duty of a trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would 
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required to enforce remedies when certain trigger events occur (such as a covenant breaches). The 
trustee either relies on its own discretion or the instruction of a controlling majority of the investors to 
enforce the obligations of the issuer/servicer (Macaulay, 2004). In such cases, the trustee is expected 
to leverage its bargaining power to protect the interest of noteholders: for instance, by securing an 
active seat on creditor committees, and making timely information requests from the issuer to inform 
the decision to switch from a passive to an active stance. An experienced trustee knows the optimal 
moment to call for dialogue amongst bondholders and issuers, and when to seek legal/financial advice 
(Wilmington Trust, 2017). Experienced trustees coordinate the envisioned actions of noteholders and 
avoid the problems and costs associated with the actions of individual investors. Trustees stand out 
based on factors including staffing levels, locations, information systems and experience in problem 
solving (Coleman and Libunao, 2013).  
Prior to default, the trustee’s role is limited to channelling funds to investors and providing 
performance reports based on data supplied by the servicer. The trustee examines the servicer reports 
to determine whether the SPV is liquid enough to meet monthly principal and interest disbursement 
obligations to investors. This is largely acquiescent, as their duty at this stage does not include actively 
monitoring the originator/servicer. The PSA often specifies representations and warranties in relation 
to mortgage origination and underwriting standards. If any of these are breached, the sole remedy 
stipulated in the PSA is usually the repurchase of the defective mortgages. Trustees are responsible for 
determining whether mortgage loan losses are a consequence of the breach of particular representations 
or warranties (Buckley, 2010). It has been suggested that some trustees failed to verify the accuracy of 
data supplied by servicers as they lacked the ability to do so. Thus, some trustees tend to enforce 
representations and warranties based on the honour system even though they have litigation as a 
disciplining device at their disposal (Levitin, 2010).  
Although the precise role of trustees is specified in the PSA, market participants including 
investors and rating agencies have increasingly assumed that trustees have a comprehensive active 
monitoring role. However, some of these PSAs are lengthy contractual documents which tend to be 
vague and ambiguous. Consequently, investors unrealistically expect trustees to perform the duties of 
other parties such as servicers (ABA, 2010).  
                                                 
take if he had only himself to consider, the duty rather is to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment 
for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide.” 
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Moreover, Morton (2005) argues that trustees’ compensation does not cover services they have 
not been commissioned for. Thus, they are not appropriately compensated for active monitoring. In 
addition, trustees have no commercial interest in the securitization transaction and they merely follow 
documentation to determine the appropriate course of action in given circumstances. Trustees perform 
a range of ministerial duties and take enforcement actions on behalf of investors, if breaches are 
discovered. In his congressional witness statement, Levitin (2010) states that, the trustee’s duties are 
largely limited unless a default event occurs.7 Although the role of the trustee is mostly passive, this 
function becomes active when the deal or the issuer is experiencing distress or default. The duties of 
the trustee during such circumstances are variable and relatively fluid (Schwarcs and Sergi, 2008).  
One strand of literature focuses on the problems trustees encounter. Allon (2009) argues that 
trustees experience significant difficulty in keeping up with technological advancements and the 
increasing complexity of assets in their custody. As transactions become more complex, the trustee's 
role of monitoring payments and other parties grows complicated (Spiotto, 2012). Furthermore, 
relative to other parties, trustees’ fees are the lowest hence their compensation may not reflect the 
increasing complexity of structured instruments. Additionally, they may have been under-resourced or 
lacked the incentive to detect fraud and misrepresentation in structured transactions (Colloff, 
2005; Allon, 2009). Despite all these barriers, we expect that reputable trustees are better situated to 
counter these drawbacks, or are at least perceived to be so. 
2.2. Intermediaries as delegated monitors 
Traditional financial intermediation theories focus on the ability of intermediaries to reduce the 
frictions of transaction costs and asymmetric information (Allen and Santomero, 1997). The 
securitization chain is fraught with several degrees of information asymmetries where one party 
usually has an information advantage over another regarding the quality of the underlying assets 
(Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). For instance, originators/servicers are more knowledgeable than 
investors are about collateral quality. Adverse selection occurs where lenders securitize low quality 
loans and the ex-post moral hazard problems emerge because of reduced incentives to monitor 
underlying borrowers after the transaction closes. With regard to servicing, the main areas of 
contention are reimbursable costs, mortgage modification and foreclosure decisions.8 Investors could 
                                                 
7 In most cases, default events depend on the financial condition of the originator/servicer. 
8 First, for mortgages that are less than 90 days delinquent, the servicer must advance interest payments to the trust. Second, in the event of foreclosure, 
the servicer incurs all expenses out of pocket. The servicer is only reimbursed when the property is sold, consequently, this creates an incentive for the 
servicer to overstate expenses particularly during periods of high recovery rates. Finally, since the servicer’s compensation is a fixed percentage of 
mortgages outstanding, there is an incentive to modify terms and defer foreclosure on delinquent mortgages. 
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address this by stipulating stringent modification and foreclosure rules in the PSA or by granting the 
servicer autonomy to administer the servicing function in the best interests of investors. In the absence 
of a trustee, these options would require investors to actively monitor the servicer’s expenses.  
The securitization arrangement presents collective action and free-rider (under-monitoring) 
problems as the tranched notes are issued to multiple investors.9 On the one hand, ownership fluidity, 
fragmented ownership, investor anonymity and bond liquidity worsen the collective action problem by 
essentially limiting concerted investor effort (Schwarcs and Sergi, 2008). On the other hand, no single 
investor has the incentive to incur the fixed cost of monitoring the borrower and enforcing covenants. 
The traditional financial intermediation literature suggests engaging a delegated monitor to mitigate 
both problems where an intermediary – the trustee – monitors the borrower(s) on behalf of the 
dispersed lenders (Diamond, 1984; Haubrich, 1989; Diamond, 1996). Thus, the financial intermediary 
minimises monitoring costs by avoiding the duplication of efforts in information production. Berlin 
and Loeys (1988) argue that although engaging a delegated monitor is more efficient, incentivising the 
intermediary can be costly. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the inefficiencies of inflexible bond 
covenants and the agency costs arising from hiring an intermediary.  Furthermore, the legal literature 
(Schwarcs and Sergi, 2008; Bazzana, 2012) agrees that  the appointment of a trustee is a more efficient 
option because this intermediary could facilitate coordination of strategies among investors and 
mitigate costly individual investor actions.  
 The free rider problem is resolved if the issuer, rather than investors, compensates the trustee 
(Smith and Warner, 1979). This setup creates an incentive for the issuer to persuade the trustee to 
disregard contraventions of the covenants stipulated in the PSA. However, bribing a reputable trustee 
can be quite costly as large trustees thrive on the value of their reputation. Therefore, being implicated 
in a bribery scandal could severely damage their appeal to investors and issuers alike. Consequently, 
issuers would prefer reputable trustees to engender positive market perception and minimise borrowing 
costs. Investors would also prefer honest trustees as trustee credibility is expected to mitigate adverse 
issuer behaviour post issuance.  
                                                 
9 Securitization involves aggregating and conveying relatively homogenous assets from an originator to a bankruptcy remote SPV. Assets are tranched to 
accommodate different risk and return profiles of various investors [see for example, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) for a comprehensive review of the 
frictions within the securitization process]. This pooling and tranching mechanism deviates from the traditional intermediation model. However, banks 
remain the key driving force of the proliferation of mortgage-backed securitization. They tend to play critical roles throughout the life of an MBS as 
issuer (originator), servicer or underwriter (Cetorelli and Peristiani, 2012). Generally, the issuer engages an underwriter to analyse investor demand and 
structure, price, and market the issue (Choudhry, 2013). The underwriter structures the notes in consultation with the rating agencies to meet the risk-
return profiles of potential investors. 
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2.3. Reputation Signalling 
Our research is related to the literature on the certification role of intermediary reputation.  In the model 
of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), investment banks acquire reputation by maintaining strict 
evaluation standards and their credibility is dependent on past deals. They show that, in equilibrium, 
reputable intermediaries underwrite safer issues and secure higher prices for issuers. Booth and Smith 
(1986) model reputation as a bonding strategy to address information asymmetry problems between 
intermediaries and investors. They show that reputational capital is positively correlated with quality 
under information asymmetry. Using a sample of over 3000 bonds issued between 1991 and 2000, 
Fang (2005) finds that reputable banks that offer higher quality underwriting services are able secure 
lower yields and higher net proceeds for issuers.  
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical work of Andres et al. (2012) on corporate 
bond pricing. They examine the inital yields of US non-investment-grade corporate bonds issued 
between 2000 and 2008, and find that engaging trustees with underwriting businesses reduced issuer 
borrowing costs by at least 33 basis points after conditioning on credit ratings. Consistent with superior 
monitoring efforts, they also find significantly lower bond defaults and less downgrade risk associated 
with these trustees. They interpret their results as evidence of reputational spillover effects of 
intermediaries that provide multiple services within a market segment. However, they do not find any 
evidence in support of larger trustees being better debt monitors. Based on a sample of US MBS issued 
between 2000 and 2006, He et al. (2012) find that launch spreads were higher for MBSs issued by 
reputable issuers (based on marketshare) between 2004 and 2006. They show that spreads rose because 
investors price the increased risk of reputable issuers securing inflated ratings especially during boom 
periods. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1. Data Sources 
For each deal, Dealogic provides basic information on collateral types (residential and commercial 
mortgages), the number of tranches, composite credit rating, primary yield spread in basis points over 
the reference rate, asset origin, tranche and deal value. We manually collect other deal and tranche 
characteristics, including initial constituent credit ratings, maturity (measured by weighted average life 
as explained below) and the identity of deal trustees’ data from Bloomberg.  
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3.2. Data Selection 
We collect data on all European MBS issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007 from Dealogic 
and Bloomberg. This sample consists of deal and tranche level data on residential and commercial 
MBSs. The cut-off date is chosen to preclude the influence of changing attitudes towards structured 
finance in the latter half of 2007. We focus on MBS issuances as these form the largest component of 
the securitization market. At the end of the second quarter of 2007, MBSs accounted for 62% of 
securitized bonds outstanding (SIFMA, 2017). More specifically, residential MBS (RMBS) accounted 
for 50% of all issuances while commercial MBS (CMBS) constituted approximately 12% of the total 
securitization volume outstanding.  
Tranches in our initial sample are either floating rate or fixed rate bonds issued in the 
Euromarket. However, we restrict our sample to floating rate tranches in order to circumvent the 
difficulties associated with estimating a consistent benchmark yield curve for each fixed rate tranche. 
For the floating rate notes, we use the quoted spreads in excess of the relevant benchmark (e.g. 3-
month LIBOR/3-month EURIBOR) as a measure of funding/borrowing cost, where the benchmark 
rate represents the rates at which highly rated banks can obtain unsecured debt. These spreads represent 
extra compensation for credit, liquidity and optionality risks. However, the optionality risk in the price 
for floating rate tranches is marginal (Fabozzi and Vink, 2015). Therefore, the initial spreads reflect 
the risk premiums compensating for credit risk above LIBOR/EURIBOR and the liquidity risk of the 
tranche. The spreads on the floating rate European securitized bonds in our sample are quoted 
exclusively over LIBOR or EURIBOR.  
Following, Cuchra (2005) and He et al. (2012), we do not include the reference rates in the 
initial spread to avoid incorporating a systematic component into our results. Theoretically, the 
benchmark rates are not risk-free rates. They are essentially spreads over the risk free rate to proxy for 
the relevant maturity. However, prior to the summer of 2007, the EURIBOR and the LIBOR were 
largely viewed as suitable proxies for the risk free rates because spreads between these benchmark 
rates and the corresponding overnight rates were considered to be negligible and insignificant10 (ECB, 
2013, 2014; Grbac and Runggaldier, 2015). Due to the increased counterparty risk as well as funding 
hurdles during the onset of the financial crisis, these reference rates increasingly began to reflect the 
credit risk and liquidity risk of the interbank sector (Grbac and Runggaldier, 2015). Following Fabozzi 
                                                 
10 Spreads between EURIBOR and LIBOR were virtually zero until August 2007. The spreads widened and peaked after 15th September 2008 when the 
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy.  
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and Vink (2012a), we also restrict our sample to tranches issued at par to preclude distortions of 
discounts or premiums on the actual yield spreads. This results in a final sample of 4,201 tranches from 
730 deals. 
3.3. Empirical model 
The baseline model for explaining the primary yield spread is specified as follows where the data vary 
by tranche (d), trustee (k) and time (t):  
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑,𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒‐ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑑,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑑,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑑,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑑,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑑,𝑡
+  𝛽10𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝‐ 𝑢𝑝 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑑,𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦, 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒, 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑒𝑑,𝑘,𝑡 
We explain the dependent and explanatory variables of the model below.  
LogSpread represents the natural logarithm of the initial yield spread quoted as a fixed 
premium in basis points over the relevant benchmark rate. Initial spread is a more reliable indicator of 
the actual offer price and risk premiums demanded by the market at the issuance.  
Trustee Reputation is measured with two alternative variables. Trustee Share, a continuous 
variable, is the number of deals a trustee has been assigned to as a fraction of the number of all deals 
issued in the previous year.11 Trustee Top5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trustee 
is one of the top five trustees in terms of total market volume during this period, and 0 otherwise. Top 
five trustees constitute 51.2% of all deals in our sample. We expect lower spreads on deals with 
reputable trustees as they are more likely to be more effective debt monitors.  
Pre-crisis Period is a set of dummy variables that proxy for the credit boom period; for the 
years 2005 (1 if 2005 and 0 otherwise), 2006 (1 if 2006 and 0 otherwise) and 2007 (1 if 2007 and 0 
otherwise). This variable controls for the impact of the increase in the securitization activity volume 
in the market during this period. We interact trustee reputation variables with Pre-crisis year dummy 
variables to determine whether the influence of trustee market share varied significantly during the 
                                                 
11 Trustees are typically appointed based on reporting quality and fee considerations. Their capability of handling the documentation review process is 
also a key criterion in tendering process. Large trustees typically increase their market presence by acting as one-stop shops for fiduciary and agency 
functions. These institutions are authorised to alter documentation terms and correct manifest errors (Choudhry,2013). 
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boom period. Following the intuition of  (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2015; He et al., 2016), we also use an 
alternative variable Boom – a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a deal is issued in the years 
from 2005 to 2007 and 0 otherwise. 
In order to understand factors that investors incorporate into the price of MBS, it is important 
to first take into account the generic factors considered by ratings agencies as a starting point. If credit 
ratings capture these factors accurately then they should have no explanatory power in our empirical 
analysis. Although all agencies have a relatively different credit rating methodology, their individual 
approaches tend to cover three main areas: asset analysis, structural analysis and counterparty risk 
analysis (Fabozzi and Vink, 2012b). These authors also note that majority of defaults have rarely been 
as a result of counterparty risk. The risk profile of a structured bond is therefore largely a function of 
the collateral, structural factors and the tranche’s maturity (Whetten and Adelson, 2004). 
3.3.1. Control Variables 
We construct Distance, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the nationality of the originator’s 
parent differs from the country of origination and 0 otherwise.  Information based theories of banking 
(Stein, 2002; Mian, 2006; Detragiache et al., 2008; Berger et al., 2008) suggest that foreign banks face 
informational difficulties when assessing credit applications from local borrowers, especially opaque 
ones. Therefore, they tend to focus on observables (hard information) when granting credit as this type 
of information is easier to come by. However, in their theoretical model on securitization and lending 
competition, Frankel and Jin (2015) argue that despite the relative informational disadvantage of 
foreign banks, securitization enhances competition for borrowers with strong observables (favourable 
hard information – e.g. credit score, loan-to-value ratio). Thus, these banks tend to make worse lending 
decisions because they lack or possess relatively limited soft information (e.g. borrower’s job, income 
stability). In fact, Loutskina and Strahan (2011) find empirical evidence suggesting that geographical 
diversification led to a decline in screening incentives as securitization volumes surged. Consequently, 
we expect the spreads on MBS issued by foreign banks to be higher. 
Decisions on tranching are taken depending on a number of factors including desired credit 
rating, expected client base, and market segmentation. Due to the different levels of priority with regard 
to the cash flow/loss distribution, tranches carry different levels of risk and different credit ratings. 
Investors with different risk appetites can decide which tranche is suitable for their preference. For 
instance, due to regulatory requirements, institutional investors, such as pension funds, are typically 
interested in holding the highest rated tranches. As expressed in (Boot and Thakor, 1993), tranching 
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ranks cash flows into informationally insensitive securities (i.e. safe assets) and informationally 
sensitive tranches (i.e. riskier assets). In practice, tranches are usually classified into senior, mezzanine 
and equity tranches where the equity tranche is the first to absorb credit losses. The equity tranche is 
highly leveraged while the senior tranche is unleveraged. Tranching essentially relegates investment 
risk into the lower informationally sensitive tranches, with a fundamental objective of determining a 
minimum subordination level that will render the senior security riskless. Furthermore, relative to 
investors, the issuer has more information about the mortgage pool. Therefore the retention of a risky 
tranche minimises the lemons discount (Riddiough, 1997). Retained tranches are essentially credit 
enhancement devices to shield investors from the effects of the originator’s perverse incentives (Franke 
et al., 2012).12 In our dataset, we know of deals where the issuer retained at least one tranche; however, 
it is unclear which tranche was retained. We use Retained to proxy for tranche retention within a deal. 
This is a binary deal level variable which is set to 1 if at least one tranche is retained and 0 otherwise. 
Because of the advancement in structuring techniques, the true structure and cash flows in 
different states of the economy have become complex and opaque. There are two prominent views on 
the complexity of structured bonds (Ghent et al., 2017). On the one hand, if the primary objective of 
structuring is to generate low risk securities from variable quality collateral, then complexity is just a 
natural consequence of structuring. In this case, deals backed by low quality collateral feature more 
intricate and complicated structures. However, the quality of the underlying collateral is not necessarily 
negatively related to the default of the securities. On the other hand, complexity can be used as a 
strategic device to obscure the true quality of an asset, thereby deliberately making the due-diligence 
process cumbersome for investors. Following Ghent et al. (2017), we measure complexity as a deal 
level variable denoting the amount of information investors need to process to arrive at the true value 
of a tranche. As in their empirical model, a number of studies (He et al., 2016; He et al., 2012; Furfine, 
2014) have used the number of tranches in a deal to proxy for complexity. Using data on European 
MBSs, Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005) note that the creation of additional tranches with distinct ratings 
resulted in increased informationally sensitive tranches compared to further tranching within the same 
rating class. Therefore, we refine our complexity measure by computing Ratings/Tranches as the ratio 
of number of unique ratings in a deal to the total number of tranches in a deal. 
  
                                                 
12 Further evidence suggests that equity retention maximises originators’ screening effort (Kiff and Kisser, 2014) and minimises information loss (Guo 
and Wu, 2014). However, (Kuncl, 2015) show that although retention aligns originator and investor interests, the efficiency of this device is limited 
especially during economic booms.  
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3.3.2. Credit Ratings 
The securitization pricing literature overwhelmingly concurs that credit ratings explain substantial 
variation in initial yields. For instance, Fabozzi and Vink (2012a) find that credit ratings explain 74% 
of the variation in the yields of UK RMBSs. Other papers such as Cuchra (2005) and Fabozzi and Vink 
(2012b) find similar evidence. This is expected since MBSs are typically structured by underwriters in 
consultation with rating agencies to achieve a specific rating.  
In practice, many issuers elect to secure or report more than one credit rating on each debt 
obligation. This could be because of investment guidelines for certain institutional investors or 
regulatory requirements for certain issues to have at least two ratings. In addition, Standard & Poors 
(S&P) and Fitch ratings measure probability of default while Moody’s ratings, by contrast, measure 
expected losses. Therefore some issuers perceive that securing a Moody’s rating and an S&P/Fitch 
rating may provide additional information with regards to credit worthiness (Güntay and Hackbarth, 
2010; Fabozzi and Vink, 2015).  
Issuers have the latitude to choose which ratings to purchase. These choices allow issuers to 
selectively report only the highest rating while potentially neglecting unfavourable preliminary ratings. 
Based on a sample of privately issued MBS, He et al. (2012) show that the rating shopping hypothesis 
[as modelled by Skreta and Veldkamp (2009); Sangiorgi et al. (2009)] was priced by investors into 
initial yields. The authors find that yields were highest on single rated tranches and least on tranches 
rated on all three agencies. Rating shopping is not the primary focus of our paper; however, we have 
controlled for this phenomenon as there is existing evidence that investors factored it into initial yields. 
We control for rating shopping13 with Credit Rating Agencies, the number of initial ratings reported 
for each tranche. Issuers are not required to report all ratings; however, ratings from all three agencies 
suggest more transparency while ratings from either one or two may indicate suppression of negative 
ratings. 
 Deals in our sample are rated by at least one of the three major ratings agencies (S&P, Moody’s 
or Fitch).14 Dealogic reports a composite credit rating that combines the credit ratings from different 
ratings agencies for each tranche. The use of composite credit ratings is quite common in the corporate 
bond literature (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) as well as in the securitization literature (Fabozzi and 
                                                 
13 He et al. (2012) include the number of initial ratings as well as ratings disagreements in their analyses. We find these variables to be highly collinear. 
However, the influence of ratings disagreements is beyond the scope of our paper. 
14 Based on turnover in 2014, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch controlled 91.89% of the credit ratings sector in the EU (ESMA, 2015). 
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Vink, 2015). We map the composite ratings onto a numerical scale where AAA=1, AA+=2 and AA=3 
and so on15 for the sample descriptive statistics. We categorise AAA/Aaa rated bonds as prime and 
bonds with other ratings as non-prime. Tranche Credit Rating is coded as a factor variable to control 
for each distinct rating.  
Ratings agencies use different methods and various criteria in determining credit ratings of 
securitized mortgage bonds. Some of the components of assessed risks may be tranche specific while 
others may be deal specific. Changes in deal specific risk factors tend to trigger deal wide rating 
revisions. It is therefore unlikely that tranches within a specific deal are independent of each other. For 
instance, the ratings on multiple tranches tend to be modified around the same time (Adelino, 2009). 
Therefore, we cluster standard errors at the deal level to mitigate correlation of errors within deals 
(Cuchra, 2005). 
3.3.3. Structural factors 
Credit enhancements are techniques used in structuring MBSs in order to increase the credit quality of 
the bonds and achieve favourable ratings. An MBS issuer consults credit ratings agencies to ascertain 
the required levels of credit enhancement necessary for the issue to attain the desired credit ratings. 
The most common form of credit enhancement is subordination in which deals follow a 
senior/subordinate structure. Subordinated tranches absorb losses before senior tranches do. The 
subordinate tranches are more exposed to credit losses from the underlying collateral; consequently, 
senior tranches receive higher ratings but lower returns. This variable features as a common control 
variable in the securitization literature (He et al., 2016; Fabozzi and Vink, 2012b; He et al., 2012). We 
compute the Subordination for each tranche in our sample. This variable is computed as the value of 
tranches in the same deal that have an equal or higher rating than the given tranche as a fraction of the 
total deal value. As our main measure of deal structure, this variable proxies for the credit support 
offered by lower tranches in each deal. As Whetten and Adelson (2004) note, subordination levels and 
tranche sizes determine how the risk of the collateral is redistributed among tranches. Subordination 
levels indicate the absolute risk levels for each tranche while size16 defines tranche liquidity. We 
control for tranche sizes using Size, which we compute as the natural logarithm of the principal value 
of the relevant tranche.  
                                                 
15 We map the composite ratings onto a numerical scale where AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4, A+=5, A=6, A−=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB−=10, 
BB+=11, BB=12, BB−=13, B+=14, B=15, B−=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC−=19 and CC=20. 
16 Smaller deals have fewer tranches and Cuchra (2005) attribute this to issuers’ goal of fostering liquidity on the secondary market. However, Schaber 
(2008)  argues that this trend is due to the cost inefficiency associated with marketing and research efforts by originators and investors respectively. 
16 
 
Rather than nominal maturity, issuers tend to place more emphasis on the weighted average 
life17 of the securitized bonds. Unlike nominal maturity, weighted average life is a composite metric 
of effective maturity that incorporates appropriate prepayment assumptions. Therefore, the weighted 
average life in years will always be shorter than the nominal maturity of a mortgage backed security. 
There is ample evidence indicating that weighted average life is a major determinant of launch spreads 
(Cuchra, 2005; Cuchra and Jenkinson, 2005; He et al., 2016; He et al., 2012). Consequently, we control 
for effective maturity using the Weighted Average Life (as reported by Bloomberg) for each tranche. 
Although all the MBSs in our sample are floating rate notes, a number of bonds are structured 
as step-up bonds where the offered spread at issuance resets after a given period. We control for this 
using a dummy variable, Step-up tranche, which takes the value of 1 if the relevant MBS is a step-up 
note and 0 otherwise.  
3.3.4. Asset factors 
Asset analysis involves evaluating the quality of collateral underlying the deal. This quality differs 
across countries and issuers. Our sample contains tranches backed by two distinct types of collateral 
as residential and commercial mortgages. When rating RMBSs, agencies devote more attention to 
underwriting standards and historical loss data. However, the focus of agencies when rating CMBSs 
is the income earning capacity of the property (Kothari, 2006). Therefore, due to the differing risk 
profiles of both types of securities, it is expected that the pricing considerations of RMBS differ from 
those of CMBS. Consequently, we use Collateral as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
RMBS and 0 for CMBS. 
Fabozzi and Vink (2012b) provide empirical evidence underscoring the importance of country 
of origination as an essential consideration for pricing securitized bonds. The authors also show that 
credit ratings agencies lay emphasis on the country of origination as this can greatly influence the 
performance of the securities owing to variations in macroeconomic conditions, legal systems, cash 
flow currencies and origination standards. Prepayment patterns tend to be a function of country of 
origination and the overall profile of the collateral (Cuchra, 2005). In general, countries with expected 
unfavourable economic conditions warrant more conservative assumptions in generating credit ratings. 
                                                 
17 According to Cuchra (2005) nominal maturity is less meaningful for securitization issues because weighted average life incorporates essential modelling 
factors such as prepayment assumptions, embedded options and expected repayment speed of the underlying assets. In contrast with corporate bonds, the 
nominal maturity of MBSs is unrelated to the expected date of principal repayment.  
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To this effect, we control for country risk by including country fixed effects in all specifications to 
capture geographically induced variations respectively. 
We employ a fixed effects model where time (issuance-time) and issuer and trustee effects are 
conditioned out in order to account for issuer and trustee specific attributes. On the one hand, pooled 
cross-sectional data has the advantage of increasing the sample size, which in turn improves the 
precision of estimators assuming that the relationships being estimated are temporally stable. However, 
this assumption may be too strict and time dummy variables can be used to allow for some variation 
over time (Wooldridge, 2013). Also, since we use pooled cross-sectional data, the distribution of our 
independent variables may change over time and tranches within a given year may be affected by the 
same macroeconomic conditions. We introduce time (year) dummy variables to capture the net effect 
of all time varying factors (Petersen, 2009; Fabozzi and Vink, 2015). We do not explicitly control for 
macroeconomic conditions as the time dummy variables capture the effect of unobserved systematic 
period effects. In addition, including time dummy variables allows us to interact them with other key 
variables to determine whether these variables have changed over time.   
On the other hand, it is infeasible to control for all variables that influence yield spreads and 
our model is susceptible to an omitted variable bias. We deal with this shortcoming by characterizing 
possible unobserved variables, the most common of which is a fixed effect – time-invariant 
characteristics of issuers and trustees in our sample. We address the omitted variable bias by explicitly 
including dummy variables for each cross sectional unit, in other words, for each issuer and each 
trustee. These dummy variables should absorb the individual effects of the issuers and trustees.   
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
We present the sample characteristics statistics in Table 1. Panel A shows the distribution of the sample 
according to rating categories and underlying collateral. The collaterals within the data are split into 
residential (RMBS, 81.81%) and commercial (CMBS, 18.19%) categories. Based on the composite 
rating, the sample comprises 1,568 (37.32%) prime tranches and 2,633 (62.68%) non-prime tranches. 
Panel B shows that a large number of tranches receive multiple ratings (51.06% and 42.80% for 3 and 
2 ratings, respectively) while only 6.14% of tranches are solely rated. Panel C shows top 5 trustees and 
top 10 issuers based on number of deals. The trustee market seems rather concentrated as the top 5 
trustee banks were party to 51.23% of all deals issued. 
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In Table 2, we categorise the tranches into cohorts based on rating category and country of collateral 
(country of risk). 54.8% of all tranches are based on assets originated in the UK, followed by Spain 
(13.12%) and Netherlands (8.97%). These three countries account for 76.89% of the tranches in our 
sample.  
In Table 3, we present the descriptive statistics for the aggregate sample. The mean spread is 
66.18 basis points (bps) for the full sample compared to 62.55 bps for RMBSs and 82.46 bps for 
CMBSs. RMBS deals, averaging approximately €2.17 billion, are more than twice the size of an 
average CMBS deal (€768 million). Similarly, RMBS tranches are 1.79 times larger than CMBS 
tranches suggesting that RMBS issues contain relatively more tranches per deal. RMBS deals have an 
average of 9.29 tranches per deal and at least 4 distinct rating categories while CMBS deals typically 
contain 6.64 tranches with 5.19 unique rating groups. The median rating for the whole sample is 4.00 
which corresponds to AA−.  
4. Regression Results 
We estimate our models progressively. First, we present the results for the full sample. Subsequently, 
we split the sample into two groups as prime (AAA rated) tranches and non-prime (non-AAA rated) 
tranches according to risk categories to examine whether reputational effects differ depending on the 
level of risk taken by the investors.  
 
4.1. Trustee reputation variables 
Results for the full sample are presented in Table 4 in six columns. We first employ Trustee Top5 only 
(in column 1) and find that it has an insignificant coefficient.  This implies that the reputation of trustees 
had no impact on spreads. It is consistent with the prevalent view in the literature that investors 
perceive trustees as ineffective monitoring devices (Amihud et al., 2000; Schwarcs and Sergi, 
2008; Bavoso, 2015; Spiotto, 2012).  
Before introducing the interactions with the year dummy variables, it is worth noting the impact 
of the pre-crisis period (2005-2007) on initial yield spreads of MBSs. We find consistently significant 
and negative coefficients for the year dummy variables for the pre-crisis years (base year is 2000). 
Initial yields gradually declined during these years. European securitization activity soared between 
2005 and 2007 and this period corresponds to highest activity values in our sample. These results 
capture the decline in return on financial assets due to general credit cycle conditions during this period. 
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We introduce Trustee Top5’s interaction with the pre-crisis period (Boom) in column 2 of 
Table 4.  We find Trustee Top5 x Boom to be statistically significant and negative. This indicates that 
investors started to perceive reputable trustees to be more effective debt monitors as the volume of 
issuance increased in the credit boom period before the financial crisis. Investors may have assumed 
that trustees were relatively passive parties in MBS deals in general. However, it seems that during the 
progressive phase of the credit expansionary period, investors started to rely on reputable trustees, as 
more effective debt monitors, to shield them from possible increasing risks in MBS deals. The negative 
spreads are consistent with the reputation buying effect identified by (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2015). 
They study the certification effect of underwriters of bank debt from 2003 to 2013 and find evidence 
of reputation discounts and these discounts increased significantly during the crisis period. 
We subsequently interact Trustee Top5 with each of the year variables for the pre-crisis credit 
expansionary period (2005, 2006 and 2007) in column 3. We find that all of the coefficients for Trustee 
Top5 x 2005, Trustee Top5 x 2006 and Trustee Top5 x 2007 are significant and the size of the 
coefficient increased as the financial crisis loomed. This shows that as the credit markets expanded 
rapidly between 2005 and 2007, investors perceived trustee reputation to be increasingly important in 
mitigating possible MBS risks.    
We follow a similar approach in employing Trustee Share and interacting it with pre-crisis 
year dummy variables in columns 4 to 6 of Table 4. We find that Trustee Share is negatively related 
to spreads and is statistically significant (column 4). Different from the dummy trustee reputation 
proxy (Trustee Top5) this finding shows that investors perceived trustees as effective monitoring 
devices. However, when we interact Trustee Share with Boom and pre-crisis year dummy variables 
the coefficient of Trustee Share becomes statistically insignificant. In contrast, and similar to results 
reported above, all of the coefficients for  Trustee Share x Boom (column 5), Trustee Top5 x 2005, 
Trustee Top5 x 2006 and Trustee Top5 x 2007 (column 6) are significant. We also observe that the 
coefficients for the latter two variables are significantly larger. Overall, we find similar results with 
our two alternative trustee reputation indicators.  
4.2. Other variables 
Out of the three main control variables, only Distance is statistically significant in all models. This 
provides some evidence that, consistent with our expectations, investors value local issuer expertise, 
where it is expected that domestic banks would be more specialised due to their familiarity with the 
local market. Thus, they are more likely to detect borrower misrepresentation and extend safer loans. 
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Retained is not significant in any of the specifications. Retention as an alignment device seems to have 
lost its importance since it does affect issuers’ borrowing costs. Ratings/Tranches is weakly significant 
but only in some of the models.  
We observe that the number of rating agencies associated with a deal is a significant predictor 
of spreads. Using spreads on MBSs rated by all three agencies as the reference category, initial yields 
on notes rated by two agencies were between 6% to 8% higher, while the premium on those rated by 
one agency ranged from 12% to 14%. Our cautious interpretation is that investors incorporate the value 
of rating triangulation into the pricing process. Reported ratings from all three agencies suggest more 
transparency while ratings from either one or two may indicate suppression of negative ratings. 
Subordination is strongly significant in all of the models and it seems that credit ratings do not 
completely capture the leverage effects within deals and subordination signals generally higher risk 
deals. Weighted Average Life is a key determinant of initial spreads as this variable is significant and 
consistently positive in all specifications in Table 4. This finding is consistent with Cuchra (2005), 
where launch spreads were persistently positively related to effective maturity. Liquidity, proxied by 
Size, is not significant in any of the specifications.  
With regards to collateral, spreads on RMBS notes were at least 12% lower than initial funding 
costs associated with CMBS notes. This is consistent with our expectations as commercial mortgages 
are larger, less regulated and attract more risk weighting. Also, there is comparatively less competition 
in the commercial mortgage market hence the prices of these mortgages are higher compared to the 
prices of residential mortgages.  
4.3. Prime versus non-prime tranches 
We split the sample into prime (AAA rated) and non-prime (non-AAA rated) subsamples to test the 
impact of trustee reputation on spreads under different risk levels. Existing literature argues that 
investors do not solely rely on credit ratings and shows that they consider other indicators  (such as 
issuer reputation, rating bias and creditor protection) that were already incorporated in credit ratings 
when pricing MBSs (Fabozzi and Vink, 2012a). Here we aim to examine whether investor behaviour 
changes depending on the risk level of the tranches.  
We present the results for the Trustee Top5 in Table 5 for prime (columns 1 to 3) and non-
prime (4 to 6) tranches. Our findings for the two sub-samples are very similar to the results reported 
above for the main sample. We find that Trustee Top5 is insignificant for both sub-samples. We also 
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find that all Trustee Top5 and pre-crisis years interaction variables are statistically significant with 
similar size coefficients.  It seems that investors generally perceive trustees as ineffective debt monitors 
for all MBS tranches regardless of risk levels. They incorporate the value of reputable trustees into 
yields but only during the periods of increased market activity. We present the results for the Trustee 
Share in Table 6 for prime (columns 1 to 3) and non-prime (4 to 6) tranches. We find that Trustee 
Share is significant for both sub-samples when employed without the interaction variables; however, 
the coefficients for this variable lose their significance when interaction variables for the pre-crisis 
years are introduced into the model. We consistently find that during the pre-crisis period, investors 
valued trustee reputation, regarding trustees as efficient monitors during risky periods.  
Turning to the other variables, in Tables 5 and 6, we find that the rating shopping (Credit 
Rating Agencies) variables are mostly insignificant for AAA tranches. Investors do not seem to be 
sceptical when tranches are rated AAA and the involvement of multiple rating agencies in deal 
structuring seems to be of little importance to AAA investors. This finding resonates with the argument 
that the demand for collateral fed into the demand for high-quality asset-backed securities (Gorton and 
Metrick, 2012b). On the other hand, Credit Rating Agencies remains positive and highly significant 
in all specifications for the non-prime sample. Unlike investors of prime tranches, investors of non-
prime tranches discounted the required yields as the number of agencies increased. This is not 
surprising as it is less likely that issuers, regardless of size, can influence all three rating agencies to 
report favourable ratings only. Reporting ratings from two agencies does not necessarily mean that the 
unfavourable ratings from a third agency have been suppressed. However, using notes rated by three 
agencies as the base, we find that yields on non-prime tranches rated by two agencies are 5% to 7% 
higher while spreads on those rated by just one agency were around 18% to 19% higher. We find that 
Rating/Tranches variable is strongly significant and positively related to spreads for the prime sample 
only. This variable captures the number of information sensitive categories within a deal. Thus, spreads 
are higher for AAA rated tranches in deals with more information sensitive tranches.  
Similar to the full sample, we find some significance for the Distance variable; however, this 
finding is confined to prime tranches. Therefore, even though investors of prime tranches may have 
overly relied on credit ratings, they demanded higher yields when foreign banks originated the 
underlying assets. The size and significance of coefficients for Weighted Average Life show similar 
patterns for both prime and non-prime samples; however, coefficients are much larger in the prime 
sample. Size, on the other hand, is only significant for prime tranches and carries a negative sign. This 
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means that investors of prime tranches demand lower liquidity premiums and higher maturity 
premiums.  
5. Conclusion 
We consider the role of trustees – who are nominated to protect the interests of investors – in 
securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. There is a growing literature 
showing that investors attempted to incorporate the potential costs of misaligned interests in the yields 
of securitization products in the pre-crisis period. We contribute to this literature by investigating 
whether investors factored trustee reputation into the valuation of MBSs. We do this by examining the 
effect of reputation on primary spreads of MBSs using a large sample of rated European securitization 
issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. 
We find that hiring reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior 
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Furthermore, the importance of reputable trustees for risk mitigation 
increased gradually as the financial crisis loomed. Overall, our findings suggest that the reputation of 
trustees was regarded as a critical yardstick, as risk assessment became more difficult. Thus, investors 
began to associate trustee reputation with effective debt monitoring as the concern for defaults grew 
in boom periods. We also show that although investors incurred substantial losses during the financial 
crisis, they did not exclusively rely on credit ratings. They took steps to protect their investments, 
however inadequate, by adjusting the valuations of the structured notes they purchased.  
The role of the trustee may be a passive one, especially with respect to breaches. However, it 
is unclear whether investors initially appreciated how passive the trustee’s role was. In an attempt to 
revive and reform securitization, regulators have proposed the inclusion of another third party, an 
independent reviewer, into the securitization chain. Public comments on early drafts of Regulation AB 
(SEC, 2014) revealed that investors and other stakeholders were against allocating this role to trustees 
due to concerns about affiliations with other parties such as servicers. Investors have clearly outlined 
their frustrations against trustees and it is unclear whether these sentiments persist. Therefore, 
consistent with the proposal of Regulation AB, trustees should not be in the position of appointing 
independent credit reviewers as this might compound investor concerns about conflicting interests. 
The US banking industry’s trade association argues that trustees were not complicit in the 
deteriorating quality of MBSs during the financial crisis (ABA, 2010). They stress that although the 
responsibilities of trustees in MBS transactions exceed those embedded in conventional corporate debt 
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transactions, the request for compensation from trustees is evidence that market participants have 
clearly misinterpreted the remit of trustees. In this regard, responsibilities of the trustees should be 
clearly outlined to avoid further misinterpretation. Recent policy changes in the European 
Securitization market may have remedying implications on some of the issues highlighted above. We 
expect that the implementation of the EU framework on Simple, Transparent, and Standardised (STS) 
Securitizations should limit, possibly eliminate, and spread variation due to issuer and trustee 
reputation.   
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
 
Panel A: Tranche distribution by rating categories and underlying collateral 
Collateral Prime Non-Prime Total Percentage 
Commercial mortgages 219 545 764 18.19% 
Residential mortgages 1,349 2,088 3437 81.81% 
Total 1,568 2,633 4,201 100.00% 
Percentage 37.32% 62.68%     
 
Panel B: Tranche distribution by number of ratings secured 
No. of Ratings RMBS CMBS Total Percentage 
1 218 40  258  6.14% 
2 1,277 521  1,798  42.80% 
3 1,942 203  2,145  51.06% 
Total 3,437 764 4,201 100.00% 
 
 
Panel C: Top issuing and trustee banks (number of deals) 
Issuing Banks Percentage   Trustee Banks Percentage 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 4.90%   Stichting Security 12.86% 
Ally Financial Inc 4.39%   Bank of New York 11.94% 
Morgan Stanley 3.37%   JPMorgan Chase & Co. 9.90% 
Barclays Bank Plc 2.96%   Deutsche Bank 8.88% 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 2.76%   Capita Plc 7.65% 
NRAM PLC 2.55%     
Kensington Group Plc 2.35%     
Credit Suisse AG 2.24%     
Commerzbank AG 2.14%     
Banco Santander SA 2.04%     
Deutsche Bank AG 2.04%       
HBOS Plc 2.04%       
  33.78%     51.23% 
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Table 2 
Country of issuance 
  RMBS   CMBS   All Issues 
Country of Risk Prime 
Non-
Prime 
Total 
 
Prime 
Non-
Prime 
Total 
 
Frequency Percentage 
United Kingdom 757  1,092  1,849      132  321     453      2,302  54.80% 
Spain  213   332   545     2      4    6    551  13.12% 
Netherlands  118   250   368     2     7    9    377  8.97% 
Germany    48   109   157   54  139     193    350  8.33% 
Italy  122   154   276   15    31  46    322  7.66% 
Portugal    24    57     81          81  1.93% 
Ireland    37    34     71   1      3    4      75  1.79% 
France    11      9     20   12    34  46      66  1.57% 
Greece 8    17     25          25  0.60% 
Sweden 5      9     14     1      6    7      21  0.50% 
Belgium 5    13     18          18  0.43% 
Russian Federation      9  9           9  0.21% 
Switzerland 1      1  2           2  0.05% 
Ukraine      2  2           2  0.05% 
Total 1,349  2,088  3,437      219  545     764      4,201  100.00% 
Percentage     81.81%       18.19%     100.00% 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Type N Mean Median Std. Dev p75 
Spread (basis points) RMBS  3,437   62.55   30.00   87.86   65.00  
  CMBS  764   82.46   48.00   99.76   86.00  
  Total  4,201   66.18   34.00   90.46   72.00  
Weighted Average Life  RMBS  3,437   5.33   4.99   3.21   6.90  
 (years) CMBS  764   5.99   6.00   1.86   7.00  
  Total  4,201   5.45   5.07   3.02   6.95  
Credit Rating RMBS  3,437   4.68   3.00   3.89   9.00  
  CMBS  764   4.95   4.00   3.68   9.00  
  Total  4,201   4.73   3.00   3.86   9.00  
Number of Ratings RMBS  3,437   4.00   4.00   1.27   5.00  
  CMBS  764   5.19   5.00   1.33   6.00  
  Total  4,201   4.21   4.00   1.36   5.00  
Number of Tranches RMBS  3,437   9.29   7.00   5.85   14.00  
  CMBS  764   6.64   6.00   2.20   8.00  
  Total  4,201   8.81   7.00   5.47   13.00  
Ratings/Tranches RMBS  3,437   0.59   0.60   0.30   0.83  
  CMBS  764   0.79   0.80   0.17   1.00  
  Total  4,201   0.62   0.67   0.29   0.83  
Subordination RMBS  3,437   0.06   0.05   0.08   0.09  
  CMBS  764   0.16   0.13   0.15   0.23  
  Total  4,201   0.08   0.05   0.10   0.10  
Tranche Value (€ million) RMBS  3,437   244.00   45.60   479.00   255.00  
  CMBS  764   136.00   53.10   202.00   135.00  
  Total  4,201   224.00   47.50   444.00   227.00  
Deal Value (€ million) RMBS  3,437  2,170.00  1,110.00  2,390.00  2,630.00  
  CMBS  764   768.00   661.00   440.00   970.00  
  Total  4,201  1,910.00  1,010.00  2,240.00  2,000.00  
Trustee Share RMBS  3,395   0.09   0.09   0.05   0.12  
  CMBS  764   0.07   0.06   0.04   0.09  
  Total  4,159   0.08   0.08   0.05   0.11  
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Table 4             
The impact of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of MBS tranches     
This table reports OLS regressions of the log of initial yield spread (logspread) of European MBS tranches on trustee reputation, deal, collateral and tranche-level 
characteristics. The sample includes all rated floating tranches issued between 1999 and June 2007. Trustee Share is the number of deals a trustee has been assigned to 
as a fraction of the number of all deals issued in the previous year. Trustee Top5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trustee is one of the top five trustees 
in terms of total market volume during this period, and 0 otherwise. Boom equals to 1 if a deal is issued in the years from 2005 to 2007 and 0 otherwise. Ratings/Tranches 
is the ratio of number of distinct rating classes within a deal divided by number of tranches per deal. Retained is a dummy variable equals 1 if a tranche in the relevant 
deal is retained. Distance is a dummy variable equals 1 if an issuer’s nationality of operations differs from the home country of the parent institution. Credit Rating 
Agencies is the number of initial ratings reported for a tranche. Subordination is the value of tranches with an identical or a better rating as a fraction of the total deal 
value. Step-up tranche is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spread quoted at issuance is adjusted upwards on a specified future date and 0 otherwise. Weighted Average 
Life is the natural logarithm of the mean number of years the principal value of a tranche remains unpaid. Size is the natural logarithm of tranche face value in Euros. 
Rating dummy variables indicate initial effective tranche credit rating. Collateral is the type of asset backing the structured bond grouped as commercial and residential 
mortgages. Issuer fixed effects is a set of dummy variables indicating each issuer. Country dummy variables equal 1 when the asset is originated in the relevant country 
and 0 otherwise. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance periods annually. The omitted categories are tranches rated by 3 agencies, residential mortgage 
backed notes, and issuance year 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trustee Reputation             
Trustee Top5 -0.0558 0.1190 0.1072       
  (0.1009) (0.1093) (0.1077)       
Trustee Top5 x Boom   -0.2354***         
    (0.0346)         
Trustee Top5 x 2005     -0.1429***       
      (0.0429)       
Trustee Top5 x 2006     -0.2428***       
      (0.0399)       
Trustee Top5 x 2007     -0.3702***       
      (0.0503)       
Trustee Share       -0.5413** 0.0657 0.0928 
        (0.2266) (0.2448) (0.2495) 
Trustee Share x Boom         -2.1493***   
          (0.4018)   
Trustee Share x 2005           -1.4949** 
            (0.5976) 
Trustee Share x 2006           -2.3755*** 
            (0.4939) 
Trustee Share x 2007           -2.3475*** 
            (0.4867) 
Pre-crisis Period             
2005 -0.8318*** -0.6437*** -0.6875*** -0.7390*** -0.5740*** -0.6331*** 
  (0.0610) (0.0496) (0.0520) (0.0463) (0.0559) (0.0661) 
2006 -0.8893*** -0.7067*** -0.6720*** -0.7915*** -0.6175*** -0.6002*** 
  (0.0612) (0.0500) (0.0527) (0.0467) (0.0578) (0.0610) 
2007 -0.9047*** -0.6960*** -0.6766*** -0.7970*** -0.6028*** -0.5862*** 
  (0.0657) (0.0583) (0.0625) (0.0523) (0.0658) (0.0697) 
Distance 0.0813* 0.0970** 0.0979** 0.0953** 0.1080** 0.1102** 
  (0.0460) (0.0487) (0.0476) (0.0478) (0.0501) (0.0498) 
Retained 0.0043 -0.0107 -0.0089 0.0013 -0.0051 -0.0045 
  (0.0231) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0232) (0.0236) (0.0238) 
Ratings/Tranches 0.0683 0.1030* 0.1043* 0.0679 0.1007* 0.1010* 
  (0.0559) (0.0549) (0.0544) (0.0568) (0.0570) (0.0567) 
Credit Rating Agencies             
1 0.1223*** 0.1443*** 0.1440*** 0.1247*** 0.1391*** 0.1405*** 
  (0.0453) (0.0443) (0.0436) (0.0460) (0.0456) (0.0454) 
2 0.0791*** 0.0683*** 0.0642*** 0.0806*** 0.0743*** 0.0716*** 
  (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
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Table 4 continued       
 
Subordination 0.2239*** 0.2362*** 0.2285*** 0.2361*** 0.2350*** 0.2319*** 
  (0.0865) (0.0854) (0.0843) (0.0857) (0.0850) (0.0847) 
Weighted Average Life 0.3413*** 0.3426*** 0.3439*** 0.3419*** 0.3426*** 0.3429*** 
  (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0158) 
Size 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Step-Up tranche -0.1044*** -0.0952*** -0.0976*** -0.1075*** -0.1017*** -0.1018*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0328) (0.0322) (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0348) 
Collateral             
Residential Mortgages -0.1410*** -0.1457*** -0.1473*** -0.1367*** -0.1295*** -0.1304*** 
  (0.0503) (0.0473) (0.0467) (0.0501) (0.0494) (0.0497) 
Controlled for             
Tranche credit rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trustee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,201 4,201 4,201 4,159 4,159 4,159 
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.931 0.932 0.931 0.931 0.930 
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Table 5             
The impact of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of prime and non-prime MBSs tranches  
This table reports OLS regressions of the log of initial yield spread (logspread) of European prime and non-prime MBS tranches on trustee reputation, deal, collateral 
and tranche-level characteristics. The sample includes all rated floating tranches issued between 1999 and June 2007. Trustee Share is the number of deals a trustee has 
been assigned to as a fraction of the number of all deals issued in the previous year. Trustee Top5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trustee is one of 
the top five trustees in terms of total market volume during this period, and 0 otherwise. Boom equals to 1 if a deal is issued in the years from 2005 to 2007 and 0 
otherwise. Ratings/Tranches is the ratio of number of distinct rating classes within a deal divided by number of tranches per deal. Retained is a dummy variable equals 
1 if a tranche in the relevant deal is retained. Distance is a dummy variable equals 1 if an issuer’s nationality of operations differs from the home country of the parent 
institution. Credit Rating Agencies is the number of initial ratings reported for a tranche. Subordination is the value of tranches with an identical or a better rating as a 
fraction of the total deal value. Step-up tranche is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spread quoted at issuance is adjusted upwards on a specified future date and 0 
otherwise. Weighted Average Life is the natural logarithm of the mean number of years the principal value of a tranche remains unpaid. Size is the natural logarithm of 
tranche face value in Euros. Rating dummy variables indicate initial effective tranche credit rating. Collateral is the type of asset backing the structured bond grouped 
as commercial and residential mortgages. Issuer fixed effects is a set of dummy variables indicating each issuer. Country dummy variables equal 1 when the asset is 
originated in the relevant country and 0 otherwise. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance periods annually. The omitted categories are tranches rated by 3 
agencies, residential mortgage backed notes, and issuance year 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Prime tranches Non-prime tranches 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trustee Reputation             
Trustee Top5 -0.0563 0.1131 0.1005 -0.0142 0.1621 0.1523 
  (0.1453) (0.1556) (0.1547) (0.0881) (0.1155) (0.0943) 
Trustee Top5 x Boom   -0.2462***     -0.2313***   
    (0.0448)     (0.0364)   
Trustee Top5 x 2005     -0.1304**     -0.1690*** 
      (0.0566)     (0.0440) 
Trustee Top5 x 2006     -0.2682***     -0.2214*** 
      (0.0557)     (0.0403) 
Trustee Top5 x 2007     -0.3699***     -0.3597*** 
      (0.0622)     (0.0523) 
Pre-crisis Period             
2005 -0.7949*** -0.6666*** -0.7553*** -0.8680*** -0.7203*** -0.7673*** 
  (0.0776) (0.0739) (0.0748) (0.0634) (0.0658) (0.0672) 
2006 -0.9087*** -0.7851*** -0.7815*** -0.8931*** -0.7449*** -0.7591*** 
  (0.0770) (0.0745) (0.0778) (0.0628) (0.0651) (0.0655) 
2007 -0.8984*** -0.7819*** -0.7177*** -0.9226*** -0.7805*** -0.7149*** 
  (0.0811) (0.0780) (0.0804) (0.0673) (0.0688) (0.0716) 
Distance 0.1156* 0.1334** 0.1356** 0.0565 0.0714 0.0722 
  (0.0656) (0.0676) (0.0682) (0.0484) (0.0515) (0.0501) 
Retained 0.0215 0.0046 0.0061 0.0077 -0.0050 -0.0038 
  (0.0345) (0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0243) 
Ratings/Tranches 0.2109*** 0.2468*** 0.2507*** -0.0124 0.0202 0.0219 
  (0.0663) (0.0660) (0.0662) (0.0597) (0.0570) (0.0560) 
Credit Rating Agencies             
1 -0.2292** -0.1821* -0.1827* 0.1856*** 0.1959*** 0.1934*** 
  (0.1049) (0.1052) (0.1038) (0.0390) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
2 0.0284 0.0161 0.0112 0.0682*** 0.0550** 0.0520** 
 (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0214) 
Subordination 0.2158* 0.2487** 0.2380** 0.3942*** 0.4011*** 0.3958*** 
  (0.1256) (0.1209) (0.1194) (0.1256) (0.1240) (0.1237) 
Weighted Average Life 0.5173*** 0.5189*** 0.5192*** 0.1541*** 0.1533*** 0.1546*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0236) 
Size -0.0320*** -0.0326*** -0.0321*** 0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0011 
  (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0095) 
Step-Up tranche 0.0045 0.0130 0.0100 -0.1737*** -0.1653*** -0.1680*** 
  (0.0357) (0.0350) (0.0348) (0.0370) (0.0351) (0.0346) 
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Collateral             
Residential Mortgages -0.1570** -0.1542** -0.1584*** -0.1113** -0.1213** -0.1219** 
  (0.0647) (0.0615) (0.0607) (0.0516) (0.0483) (0.0474) 
Controlled for             
Tranche credit rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trustee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,568 1,568 1,568 2,633 2,633 2,633 
Adjusted R2 0.826 0.831 0.833 0.929 0.931 0.932 
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Table 6             
The impact of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of prime and non-prime MBSs tranches  
This table reports OLS regressions of the log of initial yield spread (logspread) of European prime and non-prime MBS tranches on trustee reputation, deal, collateral 
and tranche-level characteristics. The sample includes all rated floating tranches issued between 1999 and June 2007. Trustee Share is the number of deals a trustee has 
been assigned to as a fraction of the number of all deals issued in the previous year. Trustee Top5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the trustee is one of 
the top five trustees in terms of total market volume during this period, and 0 otherwise. Boom equals to 1 if a deal is issued in the years from 2005 to 2007 and 0 
otherwise. Ratings/Tranches is the ratio of number of distinct rating classes within a deal divided by number of tranches per deal. Retained is a dummy variable equals 
1 if a tranche in the relevant deal is retained. Distance is a dummy variable equals 1 if an issuer’s nationality of operations differs from the home country of the parent 
institution. Credit Rating Agencies is the number of initial ratings reported for a tranche. Subordination is the value of tranches with an identical or a better rating as a 
fraction of the total deal value. Step-up tranche is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spread quoted at issuance is adjusted upwards on a specified future date and 0 
otherwise. Weighted Average Life is the natural logarithm of the mean number of years the principal value of a tranche remains unpaid. Size is the natural logarithm of 
tranche face value in Euros. Rating dummy variables indicate initial effective tranche credit rating. Collateral is the type of asset backing the structured bond grouped 
as commercial and residential mortgages. Issuer fixed effects is a set of dummy variables indicating each issuer. Country dummy variables equal 1 when the asset is 
originated in the relevant country and 0 otherwise. Time is a factor variable consisting of the issuance periods annually. The omitted categories are tranches rated by 3 
agencies, residential mortgage backed notes, and issuance year 2000. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the deal level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Prime tranches Non-prime tranches 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trustee Reputation             
Trustee Share -0.5255** 0.1245 0.1649 -0.4893* 0.1146 0.1380 
  (0.2529) (0.2593) (0.2661) (0.2755) (0.3161) (0.3200) 
Trustee Share x Boom   -2.6209***     -1.9223***   
    (0.5497)     (0.4181)   
Trustee Share x 2005     -1.4896     -1.5798*** 
      (1.0140)     (0.5519) 
Trustee Share x 2006     -2.8382***     -2.0358*** 
      (0.7485)     (0.4884) 
Trustee Share x 2007     -2.9230***     -2.0632*** 
      (0.5775)     (0.5339) 
Pre-crisis Period             
2005 -0.7795*** -0.5691*** -0.6702*** -0.7478*** -0.6071*** -0.6386*** 
  (0.0544) (0.0661) (0.0922) (0.0502) (0.0589) (0.0655) 
2006 -0.8887*** -0.6702*** -0.6549*** -0.7680*** -0.6185*** -0.6107*** 
  (0.0551) (0.0703) (0.0835) (0.0495) (0.0598) (0.0625) 
2007 -0.8692*** -0.6246*** -0.5976*** -0.7876*** -0.6212*** -0.6096*** 
  (0.0611) (0.0824) (0.0818) (0.0550) (0.0664) (0.0724) 
Distance 0.1369* 0.1551** 0.1571** 0.0628 0.0728 0.0742 
  (0.0711) (0.0734) (0.0743) (0.0494) (0.0518) (0.0514) 
Retained 0.0181 0.0094 0.0103 0.0050 0.0008 0.0012 
  (0.0347) (0.0353) (0.0358) (0.0232) (0.0237) (0.0238) 
Ratings/Tranches 0.2070*** 0.2490*** 0.2531*** -0.0085 0.0195 0.0187 
  (0.0677) (0.0685) (0.0684) (0.0610) (0.0600) (0.0597) 
Credit Rating Agencies             
1 -0.2372** -0.2007* -0.2022* 0.1886*** 0.1956*** 0.1963*** 
  (0.1074) (0.1077) (0.1081) (0.0395) (0.0387) (0.0387) 
2 0.0335 0.0179 0.0131 0.0678*** 0.0634*** 0.0621*** 
  (0.0312) (0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
Subordination 0.2283* 0.2399** 0.2315* 0.3988*** 0.4009*** 0.3998*** 
  (0.1272) (0.1218) (0.1212) (0.1256) (0.1235) (0.1238) 
Weighted Average Life 0.5181*** 0.5193*** 0.5194*** 0.1544*** 0.1533*** 0.1536*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242) 
Size -0.0311*** -0.0320*** -0.0321*** 0.0025 0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Step-Up tranche 0.0029 0.0094 0.0085 -0.1780*** -0.1734*** -0.1736*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0379) (0.0370) (0.0371) 
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Collateral             
Residential Mortgages -0.1491** -0.1394** -0.1412** -0.1088** -0.1039** -0.1044** 
  (0.0646) (0.0633) (0.0634) (0.0515) (0.0505) (0.0507) 
Controlled for             
Tranche credit rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trustee fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Issuer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,568 1,568 1,568 2,633 2,633 2,633 
Adjusted R2 0.826 0.831 0.833 0.929 0.931 0.932 
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